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SUMMARY
Based on the premises of crisis theory, we expected cancer patients in-crisis to report a poorer quality of life (QL)
and cancer patients post-crisis to report a similar level of overall QL in comparison to healthy individuals. To
explain these hypothesized ﬁndings, we expected the coping resources and strategies of patients in-crisis to be equally
eﬀective and those of patients post-crisis to be more eﬀective as compared to those of healthy individuals.
The sample consisted of: (a) 217 consecutive cancer patients in the acute phases of their illness (patients in-crisis);
(b) 192 disease-free cancer patients (patients post-crisis); and (c) 201 randomly selected healthy individuals.
Established measures of QL, self-esteem and neuroticism (coping resources) and coping behavior (coping strategies)
were mailed. As expected, patients in-crisis reported a poorer QL (p50.001) and patients post-crisis a similar overall
QL as compared to healthy individuals. There were no signiﬁcant or systematic diﬀerences between the mean levels
of coping resources and strategies between the respective groups. Two-way analysis of variance indicated a group X
coping resource interaction eﬀect on overall QL for self-esteem (p50.01). As expected, the amount of variance of
overall QL explained by self-esteem was largest for patients post-crisis (27%) and comparable for patients in-crisis
and healthy individuals (10 and 11%). Patients in-crisis were not able to make their coping resources and strategies
more eﬀective, whereas patients post-crisis seemed to have enhanced the eﬀectiveness of self-esteem in restoring their
QL as compared to healthy persons. Copyright # 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Researchers in the area of quality of life (QL) have
frequently documented that patients experience an
impaired QL immediately after hearing a severe
diagnosis. This ubiquitous ﬁnding conﬁrms our
common sense idea of how one would feel when
confronted with a diagnosis such as cancer.
Another recurrent ﬁnding is that patients with a
life threatening disease or disability learn to adapt
to their condition and as a consequence report a
level of QL similar to or sometimes even better
than that of less severely ill patients or healthy
individuals in subsequent phases of the disease
(Andrykowski et al., 1993; Breetvelt and Van
Dam, 1991; Albrecht and Devlieger, 1999; Cassi-
leth et al., 1984; Groenvold et al., 1999; De Haes
and Van Knippenberg, 1985). This latter ﬁnding is
less self-evident. We do not fully understand why
patients in acute phases of their disease, e.g. after
hearing a cancer diagnosis, experience an impaired
QL while patients in subsequent phases of the
disease trajectory might experience a level of QL
comparable to that of healthy individuals. The
explanation of these returning ﬁndings is the focus
of this paper.
A number of theoretical frameworks have been
presented to help understand such results. The
theory adopted in this paper is crisis theory. The
diagnosis of a severe illness such as cancer has
been found to be perceived as a crisis (Breetvelt
and Van Dam, 1991; Weisman and Worden, 1976/
77; Ward et al., 1992). Crisis theory contends that
a crisis occurs when the diﬃculty and importance
of a problem are larger than the resources
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available to deal with it (Caplan, 1964). This
theory presupposes a homeostatic equilibrium that
will be disrupted and discontinued in times of
crisis. A crisis is temporary, has a sudden onset,
and evokes emotional tensions that need to be
resolved. The theory asserts that a crisis will
disturb the normal balance between the perception
of problems and the coping resources and strate-
gies. The habitual equilibrium-restoring actions
that had served the person in the past now fail.
This will adversely aﬀect QL. For example, a high
level of self-esteem and problem solving skills are
expected to be positively related to QL. In times of
crisis, the use of such coping resources may be
ineﬀective in restoring the QL for two reasons. The
problem solving capacity might not be larger than
usual and/or the eﬀect of the problem solving
capacity might not be stronger than it commonly
is. Clearly, the problem solving capacity needs to
be larger or needs to exert a stronger eﬀect to face
the crisis. Thus, it is expected that the QL of
patients in-crisis will be impaired. Conversely,
cancer patients who have learned to adapt to their
condition may in fact have learned to strengthen
their coping resources and strategies to use these
more eﬀectively. Consequently, their overall QL
may not be impaired despite possible physical and
psychosocial restrictions.
Traditionally, crisis theory has been applied to
treatments of acute states, such as patients in need
of emergent or intensive care (Shaw and Halliday,
1992) mental health care (Shaw and Halliday,
1992) and psychiatric care (Hobbs, 1984; Szmuk-
ler, 1987). Additionally, crisis theory formed the
basis of interventions with families of critically ill
people (Woolley, 1990) and with professionals
dealing with psychosocial stresses, for example in
oncology care (Sparks, 1988). A few studies have
used crisis theory as a framework to examine
experienced QL. For example, Ward et al. (1992)
investigated the psychological distress experienced
by 38 women with stage I/II breast cancer at
completion of adjuvant therapy. However, this
and other studies have not empirically tested
hypotheses originating directly from crisis theory
in cancer patients.
The current study was designed to explain
diﬀerences and similarities in perceived QL be-
tween cancer patients in acute phases of their
illness (patients in-crisis) and healthy individuals,
and between disease-free cancer patients in later
phases of their illness (patients post-crisis) and
healthy individuals. Two hypotheses were formu-
lated. First, to test the premises of crisis theory, we
expected cancer patients in-crisis to experience a
poorer QL, irrespective of the particular domain,
in comparison to healthy individuals. We addi-
tionally expected cancer patients post-crisis to
experience a similar level of overall QL and
psychological functioning (Singer et al., 2000)
but to report poorer levels of physical functioning
as compared to healthy individuals. The second
hypothesis was targeted at the explanation of these
expected levels of QL according to crisis theory.
We hypothesized that the QL of cancer patients in-
crisis is impaired because their coping resources
and strategies are not more eﬀective than those of
healthy individuals. The ineﬀectiveness of coping
of patients in-crisis may be caused by their
inability to enhance the use of coping resources
and strategies or alternatively, by their inability to
make the existing coping resources and strategies
more eﬀective in comparison to healthy indivi-
duals. We additionally expected the coping re-
sources and strategies of patients post-crisis to be




The ﬁrst group, labeled patients in-crisis, were
patients who were 18 years or older, in the acute
phases of their illness, and under active treatment.
The ﬁrst subgroup consisted of newly diagnosed
cancer patients who had undergone surgery for a
malignancy for the ﬁrst time and who had been
discharged from the hospital in the previous week.
The other subgroup was receiving chemotherapy.
These patients were consecutively selected by their
attending physicians or nurses in their third
treatment cycle. The patients were heterogeneous
with regard to tumor type. Seventy-two percent of
the 152 approached surgery patients and 81% of
the 133 approached chemotherapy patients parti-
cipated (N=217). The largest tumor groups
included breast cancer (32%), gastro-intestinal
cancer (16%), gynaecological cancer (15%), and
haematological cancer and lymphoma (13%).
The second group of cancer patients were 18
years or older, and disease-free for a period of
three years or longer. Since these patients had
experienced a crisis previously, they are referred to
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as patients post-crisis. They were approached via
two diﬀerent routes. Eligible patients were asked
to participate when they attended the outpatient
departments of collaborating specialists. Addition-
ally, patients were selected on the basis of patient
ﬁles of collaborating general physicians. These
patients were also heterogeneous with regard to
tumor type. The patients enrolled via these two
routes did not diﬀer with respect to clinical and
background characteristics (data not shown) and
were therefore combined. Eighty-six percent of the
224 approached patients participated in the study
(N=192). The largest tumor groups consisted of
breast cancer (30%), gastro-intestinal cancer
(16%), gynaecological cancer (15%), and urologi-
cal cancer (9%).
The third group, the healthy reference group,
was selected by means of a random sample taken
from the telephone directory in the same regions as
those of the patients. Subjects were called and, if
18 years or older and willing to participate, were
mailed the research material. Seventy-two percent
of those 279 approached, completed and returned
the questionnaire (N=201).
We mailed participants a letter to explain the
aim of the study, signed by their surgeon,
oncologist or GP (in case they were patients),
a questionnaire (see measures), and a return
envelope.
Measures
Quality of life. Measures of aﬀect are more
sensitive to changes in external circumstances than
measures of cognition (e.g. satisfaction) (McKen-
nel, 1978; Miachalos, 1980; De Haes et al., 1987;
1992; De Haes, 1988). Overall QL was therefore
deﬁned as the global evaluation of the good
(‘aﬀective’) character of a person’s life (Szala.ı,
1980). The wording of the question was: ‘How
good did you feel, taking things together, during
the past week?’ A seven-point Likert scale was
employed ranging from very good to very bad.
Physical and psychological distress were measured
with the physical and psychological distress scales
of the Rotterdam Symptom Checklist (RSCL) (De
Haes et al., 1990). In our subjects, Cronbach’s
alpha was 0.82 and 0.88, respectively. Role activity
refers to activities, such as doing household chores
and participation in activities outside the house.
These were measured by ﬁve items adapted from
the Activities of Daily Living scale from the Dutch
Life Situation Survey (Centraal Bureau voor de
Statistiek, 1983). Cronbach’s alpha was 0.92.
Coping resources and strategies. Following
Stewart (1980), we deﬁne the term ‘coping
resources’ as contextual characteristics which
include personality. Two personality characteris-
tics were examined: self-esteem and neuroticism.
Self-esteem was measured with the Rosenberg self-
esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) (Cronbach’s alpha
0.81) and neuroticism with the neuroticism sub-
scale of the Dutch Personality Inventory (Luteijn
et al., 1975) (Cronbach’s alpha 0.82). Coping
strategies were assessed with an adapted version
of the coping behavior questionnaire devised by
Weisman and Worden (1976). All items employed
a four-point response scale ranging from never to
often. On the basis of factor analyses, the
following scale structure was employed: informa-
tion seeking (5 items, alpha 0.74); acquiescence (4
items, alpha 0.68); escapism (3 items, alpha 0.69);
and irrational behavior (2 items, alpha is 0.57).
Additionally, four individual items refer to: sub-
stance abuse, social withdrawal, blaming others,
and blaming oneself.
Statistical analyses
Comparison of QL. The diﬀerences in mean
overall QL, physical and psychological distress,
and role activity are compared using independent
t-tests between cancer patients in-crisis and
healthy individuals and between patients post-
crisis and healthy individuals. To examine the
magnitude of these diﬀerences, eﬀect sizes were
calculated based on standardized diﬀerences be-
tween mean scores. Following Cohen (1988), eﬀect
sizes of 0.20, 0.50, and 0.80 were considered small,
moderate and large, respectively.
Eﬀectiveness of coping resources and strate-
gies. We ﬁrst compared the use of coping
resources and strategies between the respective
subgroups. We tested the diﬀerences in mean
coping between cancer patients in-crisis and
healthy individuals and between patients post-
crisis and healthy individuals with independent
t-tests. Again, eﬀect sizes were calculated for the
variables that achieved statistical signiﬁcance.
We then investigated the eﬀectiveness of
coping resources and strategies by examining
the relationships between coping and overall QL.
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Two-way analyses of variance on overall QL
were conducted with the factors ‘group’ and
‘coping’. The main eﬀects of coping provide an
indication of the strengths of their relationship
with overall QL. The interaction eﬀect between
group and coping on overall QL indicates whether
the strength of the relationship between coping
and QL depends on the group. In case of
signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects, Pearson Product
Moment correlation coeﬃcients were calculated
between coping and overall QL. We hypothesized
that for patients in-crisis this correlation will
not be higher than that for healthy individuals,
whereas we expected this correlation to be
higher for patients post-crisis. To adopt a con-
servative level of signiﬁcance, the alpha level
was set at 0.01.
RESULTS
On average, patients in-crisis were 54 years
(SD=15.2), patients post-crisis 61 years
(SD=14.9), and healthy individuals 45 years
(SD=16.2). The percentage of females in the three
groups was 70, 67 and 60%, respectively.
Comparison of QL. As expected, patients in-
crisis reported signiﬁcantly lower levels of overall
QL and role activity, and higher levels of physical
and psychological distress in comparison to the
healthy reference group (Table 1). Eﬀect sizes
ranged from 0.33 to as high as 1.54. According to
expectation, patients post-crisis reported compar-
able levels of overall QL and psychological distress
in comparison to healthy individuals. As expected,
they reported a signiﬁcantly higher level of
physical distress (eﬀect size 0.54) and a lower level
of role activities (eﬀect size 0.70) than healthy
individuals.
Eﬀectiveness of coping resources and strate-
gies. Table 2 depicts the coping resources and
strategies used by the three subsamples. With
regard to personality, there were no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the mean levels of self-esteem
and neuroticism between the respective groups.
With respect to coping behavior, patients in-crisis
reported higher levels of acquiescence and escap-
ism than healthy individuals. Patients in-crisis also
had lower levels of social withdrawal, blaming
others and themselves. Eﬀect sizes were moderate
to large (range: 0.53–0.77). Patients post-crisis also
reported higher levels of acquiescence and escap-
ism and lower levels of blaming others and
themselves than healthy individuals. They addi-
tionally reported a lower level of information
seeking behavior. Eﬀect sizes were small to
moderate (range 0.32–0.57).
To test the hypothesis regarding the eﬀective-
ness of coping resources and strategies, we ﬁrst
examined the relationships between coping and
overall QL (see Table 2, fourth column). Certain
aspects of coping behavior did not have a main
eﬀect on QL, such as information seeking beha-
vior, acquiescence, escapism, irrational behavior,
and blaming oneself. Conversely, self-esteem and
neuroticism as well as the remaining coping
behaviors were found to exert a main eﬀect on QL.
Second, the interaction eﬀect between coping
and group was signiﬁcant (p50.001) for self-
esteem (Table 2, last column). The relationship
between self-esteem and overall QL was r=0.32
for patients in-crisis, r=0.52 for patients post-
crisis, and r=0.33 for healthy individuals (all
p50.001). Thus, self-esteem explained respectively
10, 27, and 11% of the variance of overall QL.
Table 1. Quality of life (QL) of cancer patients in-crisis, cancer patients post-crisis, and healthy individuals
Cancer patients in-crisis (n=217) Cancer patients post-crisis (n=192) Healthy individuals (n=201)
M SD M SD M SC
Overall QLa 5.24b 1.2 5.62 1.2 5.73 1.0
Physical distress 27.88b 7.0 24.57b 6.0 21.73 4.4
Psychological distress 16.57b 5.5 16.06 5.6 14.84 4.9
Role activity 12.50b 5.1 16.40b 4.2 18.89 2.8
aA higher score indicates a higher level of the indicated aspect.
bComparisons between cancer patients in-crisis versus healthy individuals, and cancer patients post-crisis versus healthy
individuals: p50.001.
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DISCUSSION
The current study substantiates the hypotheses
derived from crisis theory. Based on its premises,
patients in the acute phases of their disease
trajectory indeed reported signiﬁcantly more QL
impairments than healthy individuals. Addition-
ally, patients post-crisis reported a similar level of
overall QL and psychological distress and more
physical distress and role activity impairments in
comparison to healthy individuals. Inspection of
Table 1 shows that the mean scores of patients
post-crisis lie in between those of patients in-crisis
and healthy individuals.
While these ﬁndings are not unexpected and
frequently documented, crisis theory was particu-
larly useful in explaining why patients report these
levels of QL. With respect to the use of coping
resources, they do not diﬀer in personality and
they do not diﬀer systematically in the use of
coping strategies, but they adopt some strategies
more and others less frequently. Additionally, self-
esteem explained an equal amount of the variance
of overall QL for patients in-crisis in comparison
to healthy individuals. As expected, this amount
was substantially larger for patients post-crisis
than for healthy individuals. Thus coping of the
patients in-crisis was found to be the least eﬀective
of all groups. This ineﬀectiveness of coping was
caused by both the patients’ inability to enhance
the use of coping resources and strategies, and
their inability to make the existing coping
resources more eﬀective. Patients post-crisis also
did not enhance the use of coping resources and
strategies. For example, they did not have a higher
level of self-esteem than the other participants.
However, a higher level of self-esteem was more
strongly related with a higher level of overall QL.
These patients may have thus succeeded in making
their self-esteem more eﬀective in restoring their
QL. This ﬁnding may explain why their overall QL
was not impaired as compared to healthy indivi-
duals. This result also emphasizes the importance
of measuring personality. Since global QL was
found to be substantially related to self-esteem, the
stability of life quality may be attributed, in part,
to personality (Costa and McCrae, 1980). Patients
who have a high level of self-esteem seem to be
better able to maintain appropriate levels of QL,
even in times of crisis, but certainly thereafter.
A number of limitations of the current study
merit attention. First, the cancer patients were
found to be substantially older than the healthy
individuals. A matching sampling strategy would
Table 2. Coping resources (personality) and coping strategies (coping behavior) of cancer patients in-crisis, cancer patients post-











M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) p p
Personalitya
Self-esteem 35.2 (6.1) 34.6 (6.7) 35.5 (5.9) 50.001 50.001
Neuroticism 16.7 (4.6) 17.2 (5.4) 16.3 (4.7) 50.001 n.s.
Coping behaviora
Information seeking 13.2 (3.1) 11.6 (3.1)** 12.7 (3.2) n.s. n.s.
Acquiescence 11.6 (2.6)** 11.6 (2.7)** 10.2 (2.3) n.s. n.s.
Escapism 11.1 (2.7)** 10.5 (2.6)** 9.7 (2.4) n.s. n.s.
Irrational behavior 3.6 (1.6) 3.9 (1.7) 3.6 (1.3) n.s. n.s.
Substance abuse 1.6 (0.9) 1.5 (0.8) 1.6 (0.8) 50.001 n.s.
Social withdrawal 1.4 (0.7)** 1.7 (0.9) 1.8 (0.8) 50.001 n.s.
Blaming others 1.2 (0.5)** 1.3 (0.6)** 1.6 (0.7) 50.01 n.s.
Blaming self 1.2 (0.6)** 1.3 (0.7)** 1.7 (0.7) n.s. n.s.
aA higher score indicates a higher level of the indicated aspect.
bTwo-way (group x coping) analyses of variance on overall QL: main eﬀect of coping and interaction eﬀect of group x coping.
*Comparisons between cancer patients in-crisis versus healthy individuals: p50.01.
**Comparisons between cancer patients in-crisis versus healthy individuals, and cancer patients post-crisis versus healthy
individuals: p50.001.
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therefore have been preferred to the random
selection procedure adopted for the reference
group. However, it should be noted that in our
study age was found to be unrelated to overall QL
(data not shown). Second, we were unable to
collect sociodemographic or clinical data of non-
respondents. While our samples may suﬀer from
selection bias, the high response rates (range from
72 to 85%) make this less likely. Third, while we
employed validated measures with established
levels of reliability and validity, three scales of
the coping behavior questionnaire had marginal or
less than satisfactory levels of internal consistency
reliability. Moreover, the operationalisation of
coping was limited in that the instrument did not
contain other relevant coping strategies such as
cognitive reframing or spiritual coping.
The current cross-sectional study was designed
to explain diﬀerences among cancer patients in
diﬀerent phases of their disease trajectory and
healthy individuals. Insight into the process of
accommodating the illness will additionally be
needed to clarify perceived QL over time. Long-
itudinal, theory-based research is expected to
provide such insights. Crisis theory can be used
as a model for understanding adaptation to illness.
As stated earlier, loss of physical integrity threa-
tens the emotional equilibrium of the individual.
While this threat may have detrimental capacity, it
may also provide the opportunity for personal
growth (Caplan, 1964; Folkman, 1997). As we
have inferred from our study, the crisis may
strengthen the individual’s adaptive capacity,
thereby enhancing his or her level of QL. How-
ever, this adaptation needs to be made visible by
examining the process over time. For example,
Holahan and Moos (1990) conducted a study on
psychological functioning with community-resi-
dent adults over a one year interval. As predicted
by crisis theory, they found that those who were
able to strengthen their coping resources experi-
enced improved functioning, even after periods of
intense negative life change.
In addition to crisis theory, a number of other
theoretical frameworks may be useful in explaining
adaptation processes, including judgment theories
such as Helson’s adaptation level theory (Helson,
1964; De Haes and Van Knippenberg, 1985;
Brickman et al., 1978; Parducci, 1995) and social
comparison theories (Festinger, 1954; Taylor and
Lobel, 1989; Van der Zee et al., 1995); control
theories (Powers, 1978) such as the self-regulation
theory (Carver and Scheier, 1982; Leventhal and
Nerenz, 1983); discrepancy theories (Calman,
1984; Michalos, 1985); uncertainty in illness theory
(Mishel 1988; 1990; Padilla et al., 1992); stress-
coping theories (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984;
Folkman, 1997); and response shift theories
(Breetvelt and Van Dam, 1991; Howard et al.,
1979; Golembiewski et al., 1976; Sprangers and
Schwartz, 1999). While these theories vary widely
in level of abstraction and breadth of coverage,
they make important and convincing attempts to
explain changes in perceived QL. Since the theories
focus on diﬀerent aspects of the adaptation
process, they may be viewed as complementary.
For example, response shift, involving changes in
internal standards, values and the conceptualiza-
tion of QL, is considered to be an important
mediator of the adaptation process. The theory is
not meant to replace other theories that purport to
explain changes in perceived QL. Rather, to the
extent that response shift is demonstrated to have
explanatory power, its incorporation is recom-
mended in such existing theories (Sprangers and
Schwartz, 1999). We strongly advocate taking
these and other theories as frames of reference
for empirical studies. Research that is designed to
compare concurrently the explicatory capacity of
alternative theories would take this line an
important step further. Such theory-based investi-
gations will stimulate and strengthen health-
related QL research, will provide insight into the
individual experience of QL, and thus help explain
intriguing ﬁndings.
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